Some basic facts:

• Some 4.7 million Iraqis—roughly 17 percent of the population—have been uprooted from their homes since the American invasion in 2003.
• 19,500 Iraqis made asylum claims in the first six months of 2008.
• $575—the average monthly assistance provided by the State Department to a family of four Iraqi refugees
• The United Nations provides some 13,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq with emergency shelter assistance.
• More than 19,000 Iraqis have been resettled in the United States since 2007.
• As of January 2009, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1,200,000 Iraqi refugees are living in Syria.
• Twenty protection and assistance centers and 34 mobile teams for refugees are established and expanded in central Iraq.
• The United Nations provides food to some 250,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria.
• UNHCR is involved with an estimated 2.8 million IDPs in Iraq.
• Some 2 million Iraqis have been forced to flee the country since 2003.
• Between October of 2008 and September of 2009, the US expects to have admitted at least 17,000 Iraqi refugees into the country.
• The World Refugee Survey estimates that 450,000 Iraqis are currently living as refugees in Jordan.
• The UNHCR’s 2009 budget for programs related to Iraqi refugees and IDPs is $397 million.
• The US supplied $175 million in aid to UNHCR in 2008 for Iraqi refugee and IDP programs.

 

There’s more … this from a report Christian Hines wrote for Sen. Richard Lugar in 2008

August 1, 2008

 

To:              Senator Lugar

From:              Christian

Thru:              Ken

Re:              Iraqi refugee Update

 

Overview

Although widespread displacement in Iraq was indeed a concern when the United States initially invaded Iraq, this issue did not become of significant concern until the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra al-Askari Mosque, which prompted violent sectarian strife.  Over two years later, as security throughout Iraq has improved and the Government of Iraq (GoI) continues to assume growing responsibility over its country’s rebuilding process, addressing the return of vast numbers of refugees—internal and external—will pose one of the most daunting challenges to the health care, education, and economic sectors of the nascent Iraqi state.  

The most recent statistics indicate that there are still between 2.2 to 2.7 million Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraq, and around 2 to 2.5 million refugees in the region.  In its Iraq Displacement & Return 2008 Mid-Year Review, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that approximately 20% of the country’s population remains either internally or externally displaced, with many additional families facing the reality of secondary displacement.  While the growing stability and decreased violence in Iraq should continue to provide ample incentive for returnee populations, each party involved in Iraq’s rebuilding—including the United States, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Industrial Organizations (IOs), and the GoI itself—must ensure that the influx of returnees does not overwhelm the tenuous progress which has already been made. 

Refugees

As more and more Iraqis were faced with the reality of displacement, those who could withstand the initial and long-term costs of fleeing to another country did.  Syria, Jordan, and (to a much lesser extent) Lebanon all served as destinations for Iraqi refugees.  Both Jordan and Syria were initially welcoming of Iraqi refugees, despite the enormous strain that this deluge placed on the host countries’ infrastructure and social services.  Iraqi refugees have never had access to an abundance of educational or employment opportunities, and as their savings continue to deplete, many observers fear that plummeting living standards could trigger increasing violence and tension between refugees and their host countries.  Over time, the socioeconomic strain of increased populations has affected natives and refugees alike.  In a December 2007 report issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Syrian government sources reported that food prices have increased by around 35 per cent, electricity by 27 per cent, water by 21 per cent, and real estate by up to 300 per cent.  In response to these growing burdens, both Syria and Jordan have introduced visa restrictions for Iraqis in an attempt to stem the flow of Iraqi refugees. 

As the International Crisis Group (ICG) observed in their July 10, 2008 report Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,

The refugee issue is part of the broader picture of how to invest in and replenish Iraq’s human resources, which have been depleted by years of sanctions, warfare and post-war mismanagement.  Many refugees belonged to Iraq’s middle class and fled precisely because they were non-sectarian and unaffiliated with any militia…Indeed, much of the qualified middle class now lives in exile and is stuck in professional stagnation…Yet, they remain an indispensable resource for Iraq…

 The return and reinstatement of Iraqi refugees remains an inevitably crucial component of the country’s development.  In order to sustain Iraq’s stabilization and assist its transition into more mature phases of rebuilding, the US and assistance organizations must facilitate this process without compromising the fragile improvements which have arisen since late 2007.  

 

Refugees-Jordan

Current estimates place the number of Iraqi refugees in Jordan between 450,000 and 500,000, although the US Embassy in Amman estimates that this number is less than 250,000.  ICG’s “Executive Summary and Recommendations” portion of the July 10^th report made three direct recommendations to the Jordanian Government on page iii, as follows: 

1. Legalize the status of Iraqi refugees already in Jordan who are genuinely threatened in Iraq.
2. Institute proper screening procedures at the borders for Iraqi asylum seekers, regardless of their confessional background, and protect their right to due process.
3. Allow Iraqis to establish charity organizations, especially organizations that serve fellow Iraqis, perhaps modeled on the Lebanese experience.

 

Refugees-Syria

Current estimates place the number of Iraqi refugees in Syria around 1.5 million.  ICG’s “Executive Summary and Recommendations” portion of the July 10^th report made three direct recommendations to the Syrian Government on page iii, as follows 

1. Design a refugee policy consistent with the need to protect and offer legal status to the most vulnerable and threatened by:
   • Creating a specific category of Iraqis eligible for a visa based on an assessment of the threats to which they are exposed and setting up adequate structures at its Baghdad embassy and border points to examine such cases, at a minimum delivering visas of restricted validity pending further checks; and
   • Legalizing the status of those already in Syria and genuinely threatened in Iraq.
2. Facilitate access and accelerate procedures for international NGOs with proven expertise working either on local capacity building or turn-key projects in coordination with the local Red Crescent Society. 

 

Internally Displaced Persons 

Throughout the first half of 2008, a diminution of violence and a slowing rate of displacement continued throughout Iraq.  While many observers believe that IDPs will continue to return to their homes as the conflict in Iraq becomes resolved, there has been increasing concern over the deteriorating conditions facing already-displaced Iraqis.  The lack of sanitary water and PDS rations, along with the absence of basic services like health care, education, and electricity confront the vast numbers of IDPs in Iraq.  Registering as an IDP in a new governorate can be difficult, particularly if complications arise during the transfer of documents.  As a general rule, IDPs face a great deal of bureaucracy in order to settle in a new governorate.  Some authorities across the country require thorough proof of authorization, including an original residence card, a PDS card, the national ID, and a letter of approval from city council member, the mayor, local police, and/or MoDM (Ministry of Displacement and Migration).  But with no means of staying consistently employed once they eventually do settle, many IDP families are enduring a sustained financial struggle.  In its 2008 Mid-Year Review, the IOM assessed 179,595 families, 60% of which said they would like to return home.  However, 41% say their property has already been occupied or destroyed.  This statistic underscores one of the more nuanced challenges of this issue: even if a displaced family has the confidence and financial means to return to its home, it may very well face the reality of becoming secondarily displaced.[1] 

The IOM is careful to point out that families choose to return home for a number of reasons, including improved security, worsening conditions in locations of displacement, or illegal status in neighboring countries.  Overall, however, it appears that beginning in January of 2007, the rate of displacement in Iraq has slowly been dwindling (see figure below). 

 

Additionally, both IDPs and refugees have begun returning to Iraq throughout 2007 and 2008 (see figure below).

 

 

 

 

The IOM recognizes that although the rate of return has been escalating in recent months, the number of returnees versus the number of those still displaced is miniscule.  Nevertheless, local authorities and MoDM have been taking measures to encourage returning populations, particularly in areas like Baghdad which saw the greatest exoduses.  MoDM has pledged to pay one million Iraqi dinars (roughly $835.00 USD) to all returning IDPs and refugees who have spent eight to twelve months outside of their places of origin. 

 

IDPs—Security, Shelter, Food, Education, and Health Care

 

Overall, 2008 has seen decreased violence and increased stability.  The Iraqi army and police forces have taken more responsibility for the security of the region, despite flare-ups in governorates like Baghdad, Basrah, Ninewa, and Missan.  “Awakening Forces” (sahwa), which are local power-sharing coalitions, have also played an important role in the increased regional security by assisting governorates and US forces in ensuring stability.

 

Adequate shelter for IDPs remains one of the greatest concerns for humanitarian organizations.  Earlier this year, the GoI issued eviction notices to all IDPs squatting in public places.  Although the Iraqi Parliament would later postpone the ruling for some IDPs, many cities have continued to issue threats and evictions.  The majority of IDPs (63%) currently rent.  Yet the increase in rental costs throughout Iraq has adversely affected the already-tight finances of IDP families.  For example, rental costs in Babylon have already increased more than 50% since the beginning of 2006.

 

Only 29% of IDPs said they consistently received their PDS food (Public Distribution System) rations, and those who did receive rations were rarely satisfied with the nutritional value of these rations.  While 80% of IDPs report access to water, this figure does not necessarily indicate access to sanitary drinking water, the lack of which often leads to serious health problems. 

 

According to IOM, IDP children across the surveyed area were “disproportionately” absent due to some of the following reasons:

• Economic difficulties
• Long commute distances
• Staying home to babysit family while parents work
• Working to supplement family’s income
• Lack of proper documents

Unfortunately, those children who have the opportunity to attend school often find the difficulties of adjusting to a new school district overwhelming. 

 

Because IDPs usually tend to reside in poor, dilapidated slums, access to health care services is sparse.  Unsanitary conditions, psychological trauma, and the lack of healthcare have exacerbated the plight of IDPs.  The absence of health care is worst in Kirkuk (71%), Diyala (30%), and Muthana (22%).

 

IDPs—Statistics and Summary

 

The IOM assessed 181,550 displaced families to compile the statistics below.

 

 

 

The IOM assessed 179,595 to compile the statistics below.

 

 

 

 

 

The slowing rate of displacement and the increasing rate of returns attest to the long-awaited stabilization and safety descending upon Iraq.  Although sectarian strife and violent insurgents will consistently attempt to undermine the progress the beleaguered nation has seen, it is absolutely imperative that returnees feel comfortable returning to their homes and resuming productive lives as citizens of a Democratic nation.  Investing in the human capital of currently-displaced citizens will expedite the long rebuilding process.  However, parties involved in this rebuilding should recognize that IDPs do not return to their homes exclusively out of a desire to live in a new, prosperous Iraq, but out of a desire to escape the rapidly deteriorating conditions being endured by many IDPs.  Therefore, the US and Iraqi governments, along with various humanitarian organizations must not only ensure that Iraqis are returning to their homelands, but that they are doing so out of a confidence and hope in their capacity to live prosperous, fulfilling lives in a transformed Iraqi state.

 

Progress on the Issue

As refugees and IDPs slowly return to their homes, the families will experience difficulty finding employment opportunities, education for their children, and the most basic health services. 

 

Perhaps the most encouraging statistic is that in examining the reasons why returnees have decided to come back to their homes, the IOM claims that 43% cited “improved security in area of origin” as their primary stimulus.  The Iraqi Government has instituted a financial incentive and subsidy program for returning refugees, and they continue to develop their ability to register and assist the growing number of returnees.  IOM has collaborated with MoDM to track and assess returnees throughout Iraq since December of 2007.  With this information, these organizations have created a database used to assist the Iraqi government in researching the issue. 

 

On August 1^st the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reports that political and military efforts have succeeded in improving the security across Iraq in the last three months.  He also said, “Although Iraq forecasts around 7 per cent growth for 2008, the new wealth has not lifted many Iraqis out of poverty or reduced unemployment levels.”  He called on the Iraqi Government to find ways to assist the refugee community in the country.

 

The UNHCR, on the other hand, is taking a less conventional approach to improving the lives of Iraqi refugees.  In a report released on July 30^th, the UNHCR announced the early success of a pilot project between the United Nations Refugee Agency and the international organization “Clowns Without Borders.”  This collaborative effort seeks to improve the self-confidence, relaxation techniques, and communication skills of refugee women.  At this point, over 50 women have participated in the program, and all report improved levels of confidence through the program’s unique approach, which uses activities humor, theatre, and communications to increase relaxation and happiness.  UNHCR reports that of the 215,000 Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR in Syria, more than 19% suffer from severe medical conditions.  In addition to working directly with the women involved in “Clowns Without Border,” the three clowns who lead the program also perform shows for Iraqi refugee children.  

 

 

 

The Future Outlook

2,352 Iraqi refugees were admitted to the United States in July, bringing the FY08 total of admitted refugees to 8,815.  The FY07-08 total is now 10,423, and the government would like to reach 12,000+. 

 

The most recent military campaign began in Diyala.  The operation started on July 29^th and is led by Iraq Forces.  Currently no displacement is being reported. 

 

The ICG made the following list of recommendations to the U.S. Government in their July 10^th report:

 

1. Assume its responsibilities toward Iraqi citizens turned refugees as a result of the conflict by:
   1. Disconnecting the refugee issue from other political considerations and making financial support to refugees in Syria consistent with the level of support extended to those in Jordan;
   2. Exerting pressure on and providing assistance to the Iraqi government to assume its responsibilities;
   3.     Stepping up the resettlement of Iraqis interviewed successfully by the Department of Homeland Security, starting with those found especially vulnerable under UNHCR criteria and those who worked for the U.S. military or companies, such as translators;
   4. Removing security checks and requirements for Iraqi asylum seekers that exceed existing standard procedures and making available more and better functioning U.S. contact offices to process asylum claims throughout Iraq, where possible; and
   5. Initiating cooperation programs with host countries regarding civil service training, scholarships and exchange agreements with foreign universities.

 

In the July 30^th, 2008 Iraq Weekly Status Report, the Department of State reported that The Commission for Civil Society Enterprises, an “umbrella” organization which represents nearly 1,000 non-governmental organizations, requested funding from the GoI; they also requested “effective rather than symbolic” financial support from the international donor community.  The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has asserted that NGOs in Iraq are not receiving the funding they need to operate effectively.